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Abstract—In multi-hop ad hoc networks, selfish nodes may
unduly acquire high quality of service (QoS) by assigning higher
priority to source packets and lower priority to transit packets.
Such traffic remapping attacks (TRAs) are cheap to launch,
impossible to prevent, hard to detect, and harmful to non-selfish
nodes. While studied mostly in single-hop wireless network
settings, TRAs have resisted analysis in multi-hop settings. In this
paper we offer a game-theoretic approach: we derive a formal
model of opportunistic TRAs, define a TRA game with a heuristic
rank-based payoff function, and propose a boundedly rational
multistage attack strategy that both selfish and non-selfish nodes
are free to use. Thus non-selfish nodes are allowed to respond
in kind to selfish ones. We characterize the form of equilibrium
that the multistage play reaches and verify via simulation that it
often coincides with a Nash equilibrium in which harmful TRAs
are curbed in the first place, whereas harmless ones need not
be.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nodes forming an ad hoc network may abuse the network’s
mechanisms to achieve an undue increase of the received
quality of service (QoS). E.g., by disseminating false routing
advertisements, a node may prevent establishing paths that
traverse it and thus avoid forwarding transit traffic. This
necessitates secure routing protocols [1], intrusion detection
systems [2], or trust management frameworks [3]. However, a
more subtle method exists, referred to as the traffic remapping
attack (TRA), that can be used to bring an attacker better
QoS at a low execution cost and a low risk of detection. A
node performing a TRA falsely assigns traffic to classes: either
source packets are assigned higher priority or transit packets
are assigned lower priority (or both).
While TRAs are applicable to any network with class-based
traffic differentiation, in ad hoc networks using IEEE 802.11
they rely on the enhanced distributed channel access (EDCA)
function. EDCA defines four access categories (ACs), each
with its own set of medium access parameters to determine
the probability and duration of channel access. Packets are
mapped to ACs based on the Distributed Services Code Point
(DSCP) set in their IP header, which in turn is based on
the traffic’s Class of Service (CoS) [4]. The CoS-to-DSCP
mapping is done according to administrator policies, while
the DSCP-to-AC mapping is implemented by network-layer
packet mangling software. Thus, software such as Linux
iptables are enough to execute a TRA (which amounts
to a false DSCP-to-AC mapping). This is in contrast to other
selfish attacks, such as medium access parameter modifica-
tion, which require tampering with the wireless card drivers.
Furthermore, TRAs are difficult to detect: determining if the
monitored higher-layer traffic matches its class designation
requires deep packet inspection [5].
TRAs have so far mostly been studied in single-hop (ad
hoc or infrastructure-based) wireless network settings [5]–
[9], where they have been observed to drastically reduce the
throughput of non-selfish nodes [5]. In multi-hop settings such
as mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), the security threat
posed by TRAs is aggravated by their multi-hop impact: once
assigned false priority, a packet retains its QoS designation
further down the path to the destination. Additionally, a selfish
node can both promote its source traffic and demote transit
traffic [10]. An introductory study of the impact of TRAs
and suitable countermeasures for multi-hop wireless settings
can be found in [11]. In this paper, we perform a systematic
analysis using a game-theoretic approach and providing the
following contributions:
• from a model of quasi-static traffic patterns in an IEEE
802.11 EDCA-based mobile ad hoc network (MANET)
(Section II), we derive a formal model of opportunistic
TRAs (Section III),
• next, in Section IV we devise a heuristic rank-type end-
to-end performance metric to quantify the cost of TRAs
both for attacker and non-attacker nodes,
• using the cost metric as a payoff function, in Section V
we formally define and characterize a single-stage TRA
game in which both selfish and nonselfish nodes are free
to launch TRAs, hence the latter may defend themselves
against TRAs by responding in kind,
• we argue that MANET nodes are likely to exhibit
bounded rationality [12], i.e., limited complexity, per-
severance, and foresight; for such nodes in Section VI
we propose a multistage TRA strategy and verify exper-
imentally that it reaches a form of equilibrium,
• we verify that the multistage play most often ends up at,
or close to, a Nash equilibrium of the single-stage TRA
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game, whereupon both attacker and non-attacker nodes
typically benefit from TRAs.
Section VIII concludes the paper and outlines some directions
of future work.
II. MANET MODEL
Let G = 〈N,L〉 be a directed graph representing the current
(quasi-static) MANET hearability topology, where N is the
set of nodes, L ⊂ N × N , and (i, j) ∈ L iff i 6= j and j
is in the hearability range of i. By N∗ we denote the set of
all directed acyclic routes in G (i.e., sequences of nodes such
that for each two consecutive nodes i and j, (i, j) ∈ L).
Let R ⊆ N∗ be the set of end-to-end routes in G as
determined by the routing algorithm in use. Each r ∈ R
is represented as a sequence (sr, . . . , dr) of involved nodes,
where sr and dr are source and destination nodes. We adopt
the following notation for routes: write i ∈ r if r involves node
i; for i, j ∈ r write i <r j (i ≤r j) if i precedes (precedes
or coincides with) j on r; for i ∈ r \ {dr} denote by succr,i
the immediate successor of i on r, and for i ∈ r \{sr} define
predr,i as the immediate predecessor of i on r (predr,sr is
defined as sr). Let Pr,i = {j|j ≤r i} be the set of nodes that
precede or coincide with i on r.
Further assume that MANET traffic is composed of end-
to-end (e2e-) flows, each of which is a collection of packets
of the same class ∈ CoS and moving along the same
route. The corresponding MAC-layer frames are assigned
ACs, which they carry in the AC fields contained in their
headers, and handled accordingly by EDCA. Let AC be
the set of distinguished ACs. For ease of presentation we
restrict the used ACs to VO (assigned to voice traffic) and
BE (assigned to best-effort traffic), i.e., AC = {V O,BE},
with VO enjoying (statistical) priority over BE at the MAC
layer.
Since packet mangling software in fact amounts to a CoS-
to-AC mapping, one can define a function mang : CoS →
AC such that mang(class) is the AC that the class of service
class ∈ CoS should map to. Then, an e2e-flow is represented
as (r, ac), where r ∈ R is its route and ac = mang(class) ∈
AC is its intrinsic AC as returned at sr. Let F ⊆ R×AC be
the (quasi-static) set of e2e-flows offered by MANET users.
Without loss of generality we assume that at least one e2e-
flow is offered at each node, i.e., {sr|(r, ac) ∈ F} = N .
We refer to hop (h-)flows as the granulation level at which
traffic is recognized at a next-hop node. At a given i ∈ r,
packets of e2e-flow (r, ac) transmitted by j = predr,i,
whose frame headers contain AC fields with hac ∈ AC, are
recognized as an h-flow (j, r, hac) (in general, it may be that
hac 6= ac, since the AC fields can be modified hop-by-hop).
For completeness, assume that e2e-flow (r, ac) is recognized
at sr as (sr, r, ac). Let H ⊆ N × R × AC be the set of
recognizable h-flows.
Autonomous operation of node i is modeled as mapi :
H → AC. For an incoming h-flow (j, r, hac) recognized at
node i, where j = predr,i and i ∈ r\{sr, dr}, mapi(j, r, hac)
is the new AC field transmitted by i further along r.
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF A 10-NODE MANET WITH FLOW-SPARSE TRAFFIC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 - 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
2 0 - 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
3 1 1 - 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
4 1 0 0 - 1 1 1 1 0 0
5 0 1 1 1 - 0 0 1 1 0
6 1 0 0 1 0 - 0 1 0 0
7 0 0 1 1 0 0 - 1 1 1
8 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 0 0
9 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 - 0
10 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 -
(a) Hearability topology (node incidence matrix)
Flow r ac TRA
1 1 3 9 5 4 VO TRA− at 3
2 2 8 3 BE
3 3 10 7 4 5 VO
4 4 8 BE
5 5 8 6 1 10 VO TRA− at 8
6 6 8 BE
7 7 8 6 4 5 VO TRA− at 8
8 8 3 2 BE TRA+ at 8 & TRA− at 3
9 9 7 3 5 2 VO TRA− at 3
10 10 1 4 BE
(b) TRAs experienced by e2e flows for A = {1, 3, 8, 9}
III. ATTACK MODEL
A traffic remapping attack (TRA) that a node i ∈ r launches
upon an incoming h-flow (j, r, hac), where j = predr,i and
i ∈ r \ {dr}, consists in configuring mapi(j, r, hac) 6= hac.
Such a definition captures the fact that the setting of AC fields
under a TRA is both perfectly legal (in that the use of mapj
is correct) and ill-willed (inconsistent with mang). In light
of this, behavior of node i with respect to h-flow (j, r, hac)
can be classified as (i) neutral, if mapi(j, r, hac) = hac, (ii)
upgrading TRA (TRA+), if hac = BE and mapi(j, r, BE) =
V O, or (iii) downgrading TRA (TRA−) if hac = V O and
mapi(j, r, V O) = BE. Node behavior is moreover assumed
plausible in that it never downgrades source traffic or upgrades
transit traffic, i.e., mapi(j, r, hac) = hac if (hac = V O and
i = sr) or (hac = BE and i 6= sr). Nodes that exhibit TRA
behavior will be called attackers and their set will be denoted
A. Let us assume that each attacker is opportunistic, i.e.,
launches a TRA+ or a TRA− upon all h-flows it recognizes,
subject to the plausibility constraints.
Note that with respect to a given e2e-flow (r, ac), a
plausible opportunistic attacker i does not actually modify
any AC field when i 6∈ r or i = dr (in the latter case i will
behave neutrally), or when ac = BE and i 6= sr, or, finally,
when ac = V O and i 6= sr and i recognizes the e2e-flow as
(j, r, BE), where j = predr,i (i.e., when a TRA− has been
launched by one of the nodes preceding i on r).
The example in Table Ia shows a 10-node MANET with
G represented as a hearability topology (node incidence
matrix) and with a given set A = {1, 3, 8, 9} of opportunistic
attackers. Routes of e2e-flows were of uniformly distributed
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Fig. 1. Illustration of e2e-flows (solid arrows), h-flows (patterned lines),
and related concepts in a grid-shaped MANET with A = {2}. The attacker
performs a TRA− on e2e-flow (r, V O), hence hac2(r, V O) = BE. The set
of two outgoing h-flows at node 2 is labeled OH2. For the featured h-flow
(2, r, BE) (red), all other h-flows belong to the set of competing h-flows
CH2(r, V O). Note that the attacked flow receives worse QoS on all hops
following node 2 (i.e., is forwarded as BE).
lengths 2 . . . 5 and were selected at random1. Each node is a
source of one e2e-flow, half of the flows being VO (we will
refer to this traffic pattern as flow-sparse). For each e2e-flow
it is indicated what TRAs have been experienced and at which
node.
The following can be observed in Table Ib regarding the
selected e2e-flows:
• e2e-flow #3 with ac = V O has an attacker source, which,
however, does not launch a TRA− due to the plausibility
constraints,
• no e2e-flow with ac = V O has an attacker destination,
but even if it did, the destination would behave neutrally
due to the plausibility constraints,
• for the same reason, e2e-flows #2,4, and 6 with ac = BE
are not attacked at their attacker destinations, e2e-flow
#10 is not attacked at an attacker forwarder (node 1),
which could only launch a TRA+, and e2e-flow #1 is
not attacked at its attacker source (node 1),
• e2e-flows #1 and 5 with ac = V O each encounter two
attacker forwarders, of which the first launches a TRA−,
hence the second no longer has to,
• e2e-flow #8 experiences a combination of a TRA+ at
its source node 8 and a TRA− at node 3; this is the
maximum number of attacks an e2e-flow can experience.
Note that if all the nodes were opportunistic attackers (A =
N ) then all e2e-flows with |r| > 2 would be recognized at
destination as BE h-flows.
A similar example, where each node is a source of two
e2e-flows, one VO and one BE (which we will refer to as the
flow-dense traffic pattern) is presented in Table II. Under such
a pattern, typically a larger proportion of flows are attacked
(either experience a single TRA or a combination of a TRA+
and a TRA− along r).
IV. PERFORMANCE UNDER TRAS
For an e2e-flow (r, ac) ∈ F denote by haci(r, ac) the
AC of the flow’s packets transmitted by node i ∈ r \ {dr}
1The selected random routes were not necessarily the shortest paths.
TABLE II
EXAMPLE OF A 10-NODE MANET WITH FLOW-DENSE TRAFFIC
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 - 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
2 0 - 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
3 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 0 1 1 - 1 0 1 1 0 1
5 1 0 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1 0 1 - 0 1 1 0
7 0 0 1 1 1 0 - 1 0 1
8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 0 0
9 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 - 0
10 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 -
(a) Hearability topology (node incidence matrix)
Flow r ac TRA
1 1 3 9 5 4 VO TRA− at 3
2 1 8 3 BE TRA+ at 1 & TRA− at 8
3 2 10 7 4 5 VO
4 2 8 BE
5 3 8 6 1 10 VO TRA− at 8
6 3 8 BE TRA+ at 3
7 4 7 8 6 5 VO TRA− at 8
8 4 3 2 BE
9 5 7 3 2 4 VO TRA− at 3
10 5 1 BE
11 6 3 9 VO TRA− at 3
12 6 1 BE
13 7 5 8 1 3 VO TRA− at 8
14 7 8 5 BE
15 8 4 10 3 2 VO TRA− at 3
16 8 2 6 BE TRA+ at 8
17 9 5 8 7 10 VO TRA− at 8
18 9 6 BE TRA+ at 9
19 10 5 3 6 2 VO TRA− at 3
20 10 4 BE
(b) TRAs experienced by e2e flows for A = {1, 3, 8, 9}
and received at node succr,i. This AC is returned by the
superposition of all mapj , j ≤r i, and the corresponding h-
flow can be designated as (i, r, haci(r, ac)). Fig. 1 illustrates
e2e-flows, h-flows, and related notions. Given the set A of
opportunistic attackers, one can derive haci(r, ac) as follows:
haci(r,BE) =
{
V O, sr ∈ A ∧ Pr,i \ {sr} ∩A = ∅
BE, otherwise
,
(1)
haci(r, V O) =
{
V O, Pr,i \ {sr} ∩A = ∅
BE, otherwise
. (2)
That is, haci(r,BE) = V O if a TRA+ has been launched at
the source and no TRA− has been launched by the time the
flow’s packets reach i, and haci(r,BE) = BE if no TRA
or both a TRA+ and a TRA− have been launched. Similarly,
haci(r, V O) = V O if no TRA− has been launched at nodes
other than the source, and haci(r, V O) = BE if a TRA− has
been launched.
The set of outgoing h-flows at node i is
OHi = {(i, r, haci(r, ac))|(r, ac) ∈ F ∧ i ∈ r \ {dr}}. (3)
Important from the viewpoint of an outgoing h-flow
(i, r, haci(r, ac)) is the set of competing h-flows, i.e., h-flows
it has to locally compete with for local wireless spectrum.
These are: (a) other outgoing h-flows at i, which compete via
the local transmission queue, (b) outgoing h-flows at nodes
in the hearability range of i, which compete via CSMA/CA,
and (c) outgoing h-flows at nodes in the hearability range of
succr,i but not of i (i.e., hidden from i), which compete via
exclusive-OR reception at succr,i:
CHi(r, ac) = OHi \ {(i, r, haci(r, ac))}∪⋃
j:(j,i)∈LOHj ∪
⋃
j:(j,succr,i)∈L∧(j,i)6∈L
OHj . (4)
For the above h-flow, the pair [hac, CH]i(r, ac) determines
per-hop performance at node i, where we use a succinct
notation [a, b]i(x) instead of [ai(x), bi(x)]. We propose a
rank-type per-hop performance metric ranki(r, ac) reflecting
that an h-flow is better off at a node if it is VO and competes
with fewer (and preferably BE) h-flows. Accordingly, the
metric should rank the vectors [hac, vo, be]i(r, ac), where
voi(r, ac) and bei(r, ac) represent the number of VO and BE
h-flows in CHi(r, ac).
To validate rank(·), we have used the Markovian model
of EDCA [13] to calculate the normalized per-hop saturation
throughput Si(hac, r, ac) of e2e-flow (r, ac) at node i, given
hac = haci(r, ac) ∈ {V O,BE}, and vo = voi(r, ac) and
be = bei(r, ac) each ranging from 0 to 10. For the resulting
2 ·11 ·11(2 ·11 ·11−1)/2 pairs of throughput values, rank(·)
represents a good fit if
ranki(hac, r, ac) ≤ ranki(hac′, r′, ac′)
iff Si(hac, r, ac) > Si(hac′, r′, ac′) (5)
holds for a high percentage of pairs. (Obviously, a small rank
is desirable.) A heuristic metric is
ranki(hac, r, ac) = 1hac=BE · α · (vo+ 1vo>1∨be>2)
+ β · (vo+ 1hac=BE) + be, (6)
where 1x = 1 if logical condition x is true and 0 otherwise,
and the best fit (99.13%) occurs at α = 40 and β = 10. The
preferences of h-flows are reflected in that vo has more impact
upon ranki(hac, r, ac) than does be (since β > 1), and there
is distinct separation between hac = V O and hac = BE
(since α β).
Our rank metric induces a heuristic e2e-flow cost metric we
call flowcost, additive for VO traffic delay and bottleneck-
type for BE traffic throughput (to make both metrics compa-
rable in magnitude, we take per-node VO traffic delay):
flowcost(r,ac)(A) =

∑
i∈r\{dr} ranki(hac, r, ac)
|r| − 1 , ac = V O
max
i∈r\{dr}
ranki(hac, r, ac), ac = BE
,
(7)
where hac is given by (1) and (2). (Since hac depends on
A, the notation flowcost(r,ac)(A) is meaningful.) Finally,
a nodal cost metric has to be derived from flowcost; for
example, the nodal cost can be defined as a weighted sum to
reflect the aggregate performance of all source e2e-flows and
the importance of V O flows:
nodalcosti(A) =
∑
(r,ac)∈F∧sr=i
γac×flowcost(r,ac)(A), (8)
where γBE = 1 and γV O > 1. It is convenient to normalize
nodal costs to the all-neutral case:
costi(A) = nodalcosti(A)/nodalcosti(∅). (9)
For the above examples, under the flow-sparse and flow-
dense traffic patterns, Table IIIa shows change of nodal costs
between the all-neutral case (no TRAs) and after TRAs
launched by the set of opportunistic attackers A = {1, 3, 8, 9},
as well as nodes’ classification regarding the impact of the
TRAs. Best-fit rank metric (6) with α = 40 and β = 10, and
γV O = 2 are assumed. Attackers (neutral nodes) whose costs
have increased are classified as lose (mind) and the others as
don’t lose (don’t mind).
TABLE III
CHANGE OF NODE COSTS AND NODE CLASSIFICATION AFTER TRAS FOR
α = 40, β = 10, AND γV O = 2.
Node Flow-sparse Flow-denseCost change State Cost change State
1 133% lose 11% lose
2 -40% don’t mind -34% don’t mind
3 -40% don’t lose -26% don’t lose
4 -49% don’t mind -2% don’t mind
5 104% mind 2% mind
6 -49% don’t mind 11% mind
7 131% mind -1% don’t mind
8 -41% don’t lose -50% don’t lose
9 89% lose -28% don’t lose
10 -46% don’t mind 8% mind
(a) A = {1, 3, 8, 9}
Node Flow-sparse Flow-denseCost change State Cost change State
1 124% lose -8% don’t lose
2 -52% don’t lose -34% don’t lose
3 135% lose -37% don’t lose
4 -91% don’t lose -5% don’t lose
5 141% lose -34% don’t lose
6 -91% don’t lose -36% don’t lose
7 149% lose -6% don’t lose
8 -46% don’t lose -7% don’t lose
9 147% lose -20% don’t lose
10 -52% don’t lose -24% don’t lose
(b) A = {1 . . . 10}
One sees that, surprisingly, TRA behavior can both be
harmful to an attacker and be harmless (even beneficial) to
a node staying neutral. The reason is that from the viewpoint
of an e2e-flow, TRAs may in various ways affect the number
of competing VO h-flows – either decrease it (due to TRA−)
or increase it (reflecting stronger interference from nodes of
the same route due to TRA+).
V. TRA GAME
In a noncooperative game that arises, the nodes are players,
mapi is node i’s strategy, and cost is the (negative) payoff
function. A strategy profile (mapi, i ∈ N) can be equivalently
described as the set A ⊆ N of opportunistic attackers. A
formal description of the game, of the form 〈player set,
strategy profile set, payoff function〉, is therefore:
〈N, 2N , cost : 2N → R+〉. (10)
To investigate the nature of the game in a small-size
MANET, cost can be tabulated applying (3)-(9) to all fea-
sible strategy profiles. For a moderate-size MANET, various
game scenarios can be analyzed by simulating the evolution
(successive transitions) of the attacker set A. Some interesting
strategy profiles are: ∅ (all-neutral, corresponding to no TRAs
being launched), and N (corresponding to each node being
an opportunistic attacker). In the latter, any e2e-flow (r,BE)
experiences a TRA+ at sr, whereas any e2e-flow (r, V O) with
|r| > 2 experiences a TRA− at the first node in r \ {sr, dr}.
An observation that necessitates subtler game-theoretic
treatment is that, contrary to the intuition behind rank(·)
(whereby it is apparently beneficial to upgrade source traffic,
as α > 0, and to downgrade competing traffic, as β > 1), the
TRA game is not a multiperson Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD).
Specifically, TRA does not dominate neutral behavior, as
seen from the presence of lose nodes in the above examples.
Neither is TRA necessarily harmful to neutral nodes, as seen
from the presence of don’t mind nodes. This is because of the
complex interplay of MAC contention, EDCA prioritization
and intra-flow competition due to multi-hop forwarding in
the presence of hidden stations (where packet transmissions
from one station compete with those from up- and downstream
stations one or two hops away). Moreover, A = ∅ may, but
need not be Pareto superior to A = N ; in fact, for some traffic
patterns (such as the flow-dense one in Table IIIb), the reverse
is true, i.e., all the nodes are classified as don’t lose.
An important characterization of a game is through its Nash
equilibria (NE) [14]. For A ⊆ N and i ∈ N define
A[i] =
{
A \ {i}, i ∈ A
A ∪ {i}, i /∈ A ; (11)
then Aˆ is a weak (strict) NE if and only if
∀i ∈ N : costi(Aˆ) ≤ (<)costi(Aˆ[i]). (12)
Numerical experiments show that the TRA game may possess
multiple NE. An exhaustive search of the set 2N for 100
random MANET topologies with |N | = 10 and uniformly
distributed route lengths 2 . . . 5 (with α, β, and γV O as in the
above examples) reveals that among the 2|N | feasible strategy
profiles, typically up to 5% are NE for the flow-sparse, and
below 1% are NE for the flow-dense traffic pattern, cf. the
x-coordinates of the dots in Fig. 3a and 3b. The vast majority
of NE are weak.
Given the non-PD nature of the TRA game, one needs to
establish conditions under which TRAs pose a real danger
and so defense is necessary. Hence, one needs to predict
nodal costs at the strategy profile that nodes will arrive at
under some model of rational play. Note that while rational
play leads to an NE [15], MANET nodes are better modeled
as boundedly rational, i.e., exhibiting limited complexity,
perseverance, and foresight. Such nodes can be reasonably
expected to adopt a simple multistage attack strategy that leads
to some form of equilibrium, cf. [5], [12].
VI. MULTISTAGE TRA GAME
Suppose the TRA game is played in stages k = 1, 2, . . .,
and in each stage a node’s behavior is either to attack all e2e-
flows it can attack (i.e., become an opportunistic attacker) or
to stay neutral. Let A(k) ⊆ N be the set of attackers in
stage k. Of interest is the evolution (in particular asymptotic
behavior) of A(k), starting from any A(0) ⊆ N , under some
multistage attack strategy that can be justified as rational in
some sense. A possible heuristic multistage attack strategy
with a rational trait is for a node to:
1) disallow a behavior change if the current cost is the
smallest over a predefined number of recent stages
(referred to as cost memory, CM ); the node is then
called satisfied,
2) if a behavior change is allowed (node is currently
dissatisfied), decide it with a probability that depends
on the history of own play; the change from the current
behavior is driven by the excess of past stages where the
same behavior led to a cost increase over those where
it did not.
The above multistage strategy can be formalized simply by
specifying how A(k) arises from A(k − 1). This is given by
Algorithm 1, where εpi denotes a random event occurring with
probability pi, σ : R→ [0, 1] is a nondecreasing function with
limx→−∞ σ(x) = 0 and limx→+∞ σ(x) = 1, and the logical
condition ϕi(k) expresses node i’s satisfaction in stage k:
ϕi(k) =
{
false, k < CM
∀l=1...CMcosti(A(k)) ≤ costi(A(k − l)), k ≥ CM
(13)
Note that the first CM stages make an exploratory warm-up,
where all nodes are considered dissatisfied and so TRAs are
launched at random, governed by εpi .
VII. MULTISTAGE GAME ANALYSIS
Starting from some fixed A(0), the evolution of A(k) and
corresponding normalized node costs under the above multi-
stage attack strategy can be easily recreated in Monte Carlo
simulations. The simulations were carried out for the above
MANET examples, with CM = 10, σ(x) = 1/(1+e−x) (the
sigmoid function) and the other parameters (α, β, γV O) are
set as in the previous examples.
For the flow-sparse and flow-dense traffic patterns, Fig. 2
plots against k the following characteristics, averaged over
100 random MANET instances with |N | = 10 and uniformly
distributed route lengths 2 . . . 5, and 100 runs per instance
with fixed A(0) = ∅ (α, β, and γV O are set as before):
Algorithm 1: Multistage attack strategy
Data: Stage k
Result: Set of attackers A(k)
if k = 0 then
initialize Lose, DontLose, Mind, and DontMind
counters;
A(k)← any subset of N ;
else
A(k)← {i ∈ A(k − 1) :
ϕi(k − 1) ∨ ¬εσ(Losei−DontLosei)} ∪ {i /∈ A(k − 1) :¬ϕi(k − 1) ∧ εσ(Mindi−DontMindi)};
for i ∈ N do
if costi(A(k)) > costi(A(k − 1)) then
if i ∈ A(k − 1) then
increment Losei
else
increment Mindi
else
if i ∈ A(k − 1) then
increment DontLosei
else
increment DontMindi
end
end
end
end
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Fig. 2. Evolution of multistage TRA game for flow-sparse and flow-dense
traffic patterns: number of attackers and of dissatisfied nodes.
• number of attackers, i.e., |A(k)|,
• number of dissatisfied nodes, i.e., {i ∈ N : ¬ϕi(k)}|.
In randomly generated MANET instances, A(k) typically
(in 97.3% of flow-sparse runs and 93.3% of flow-dense runs)
converges over time to a “quasi-equilibrium” A∞ such that
∅ 6= A∞ 6= N .2 A∞ may differ from run to run on account
of the randomness inherent in Algorithm 1, and may also
depend on A(0). However, averaged over multiple runs, |A∞|
seems insensitive to A(0): similar plots were produced when
2The notion of “quasi-equilibrium” we employ reflects some existing
approaches to bounded rationality listed in [12]: the limited cost memory
CM implies a node’s constrained complexity and resources, and the form of
(13) implies limited perseverance and a myopic attitude.
A(0) was randomly chosen in successive runs. Moreover,
costi(A∞) < 1 is observed for some or all i /∈ A∞. This
confirms that at a “quasi-equilibrium”, TRAs can be harmless
to some neutral nodes.
Based on the plots one also conjectures that the convergence
occurs regardless of scenario (albeit may be slow for large
CM ), i.e., all the nodes eventually become satisfied. The
intuitive explanation is that nodes whose costs have not
increased recently do not leave the satisfied set, and the others
are more likely to try different behavior and so to lower their
costs in the near future (indeed, observed nodes’ costs cease
to increase from some stage on).
An interesting characterization of the observed A∞, reflect-
ing the rationality of Algorithm 1, is that there are eventually
very few nodes i for which costi(A
[i]
∞) < costi(A∞), and
which also fulfill the following:
• if i ∈ A∞ then ∀j∈A[i]∞costj(A
[i]
∞) ≥ costj(A∞), i.e.,
node i is an attacker, but if had stayed neutral, would
have decreased its cost without decreasing that of any
other attacker (hence, without bolstering other attackers’
satisfaction),
• if i /∈ A∞ then ∀j /∈A[i]∞costj(A
[i]
∞) ≤ costj(A∞),
i.e., node i is neutral, but if had attacked, would have
decreased its cost without increasing that of any other
neutral node (hence, without provoking neutral nodes’
dissatisfaction, which might lead to more TRAs).
In the simulations, the former type of node i was almost never
observed, and the latter averaged around 6% and 4.5% of |N |
in the flow-sparse and flow-dense runs, respectively.
One can also judge the rationality of Algorithm 1 by “NE
hits” (the percentage of runs where an NE is asymptotically
arrived at) in relation to the proportion of NE among the 2|N |
feasible strategy profiles. If the former is distinctly larger than
the latter, the NE reached by the multistage strategy is not
“accidental”, and the strategy can be said to be NE-seeking.
To get a more comprehensive view, one can extend the notion
of NE to δ-NE, where up to a fraction δ of the inequalities (12)
are violated. The plots in Fig. 3a and 3b have been obtained
for the same 100 random MANET instances as before, with
δ = 0, 10%, and 20%. Each dot corresponds to a MANET
instance with “NE hits” obtained from 100 runs with random
A(0). For both flow-sparse and flow-dense traffic patterns the
NE-seeking property is visible.
A good characterization of the above multistage strategy is
its effectiveness reflecting the ability to improve the perceived
QoS over successive stages. Assuming that all legitimate QoS
requirements are satisfied at the all-neutral strategy profile ∅,
of interest is the average percentage of asymptotic beneficiary
(don’t mind or don’t lose) nodes against the analogous average
percentage for corresponding initial strategy profiles. If the
former percentage is larger, the multistage strategy can be
said to be asymptotically effective. The plot in Fig. 3c
reflects the same 100 MANET instances, each producing a dot
obtained by averaging over 100 runs with random A(0). Our
multistage attack strategy turns out asymptotically effective
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arrived at, flow-dense traffic pattern.
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Fig. 3. Performance of the multistage attack strategy given by Algorithm 1 and its statistical significance. If a MANET instance produces a dot above the
y = x line then the asymptotic “NE hits” and improvement of the percentage of beneficiaries are larger than accidental.
in more than 70% of MANET instances both for the flow-
sparse and flow-dense traffic patterns. Hence, the asymptotic
outcomes typically feature more beneficiary nodes than do
the corresponding initial strategy profiles. One concludes that
Algorithm 1 expresses selfish nodes’ bounded rationality and
yields non-selfish nodes an effective defense against TRAs
by responding in kind. The fact that not all the nodes end up
as attackers, but all are satisfied with the costs, suggests that
harmful TRAs are curbed in the first place, whereas harmless
ones need not be. It also shows that, fortunately, responding
in kind is not a punishment that leads to a spiral of “punishing
the punishers” [16].
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a formal model of TRAs for multi-hop
ad hoc networks. This allowed us to rigorously define the
arising TRA game, for which a multistage attack strategy has
been proposed. The strategy is arguably boundedly rational,
at the same time can serve as an effective respond-in-kind
countermeasure to TRAs.
The analysis of alternative boundedly rational strategies
(e.g., reinforcement learning, trial-and-error, regret-based), as
well as rigorous proofs of convergence are left for future
research. Also, more work should be devoted to systematically
prevent or curb only harmful TRAs, as was done in a WLAN
setting [5]. Finally, simulations of Algorithm 1 in realistic
wireless networks should verify our performance model as
well as reveal the impact of transmission impairments, traffic
volume, and end-to-end protocols such as TCP.
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